The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.
Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:
Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.
Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.
The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.
「由1到100中寫出其中一個你鍾意嘅數字。只要喺唔會同其他同學答案重覆嘅情況下,寫出最大數字嘅人就可以加60分。」有冇人知點答?