ee-fi_wg仔
2020-4-28 23:07:12
The second goal was premised on reaching out to a foreign audience. At this point, it should be acknowledged that the Polish side—and primarily president Andzej Duda—made a strategic error in adopting a reconciliatory tone towards Russia,15 which was taken by Moscow as a sign of weakness and spurred Russia into more assertive action. One objective behind this attack against Poland and the use of overtly counter-anti-Semitic rhetoric might be related to Russia’s desire to normalise ties with Israel, whose relations with Poland have stagnated. This initial assault on Poland in the guise of anti-Semitism might have far-reaching consequences and could later be redirected against Ukraine and the three Baltic states, all of whom have to some extent experienced a certain souring of political relations with Israel. In this respect, anti-Semitism should be seen—even though this phenomenon bloomed in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and post-1991 Russia—as a powerful trump card in Moscow’s hand. Moreover, there is little doubt that Russia will try to use its image as the main enemy of neo-Fascism and anti-Semitism to its advantage while appealing to certain members of the EU that suffered various forms of dictatorship and where socialist ideals have traditionally been strong.
In the worst-case scenario—that Moscow’s message reaches only a limited foreign audience (since domestic success is virtually guaranteed, especially given the forthcoming 9 May celebrations)—Russia still loses nothing.